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CoRPoRATIONs-ULTRA VIRES Acr-EFFECTIVENESs oF AcnoN BY INFORMAL
MEETING OF BoARD OF DIRECTORS-Defendant insurance company issued a
policy on the life of the president of plaintiff corporation with the corporation named as beneficiary. The president, his wife in the capacity of
secretary-treasurer, and son were the sole stockholders of the corporation.
Pursuant to a divorce agreement between the president and his wife, a part
of the insurance policy was assigned to the wife at an informal board of
directors' meeting with the concurrence of the wife and son. The president
died and his stock was sold to the present stockholders. The corporation
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then sued the insurance company to collect the full amount of the insurance
policy, declaring that the previous assignment was void. Defendant, having
already paid the wife her share as prescribed by law,1 contended that it
could not be required to pay again to the corporation the amount which it
had already paid. At the time of the assignment, the corporation was apparently solvent and up to the time of the trial no existing or subsequent
creditor had objected to the assignment. The district court entered a
decree for the corporation. On appeal, held, reversed. Plaintiff corporation and the new stockholders claiming through the deceased president are
estopped to deny the validity of the assignment executed at the informal
board of directors meeting. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Crosland-Cullen
Co., (4th Cir. 1956) 234 F. (2d) 780.
As a general rule, directors can bind a corporation only when they act
as a board at a legal meeting. 2 According to many modern authorities,
however, consent of all the stockholders to corporate conveyances and gifts
will bind the corporation even though made at an informal meeting for
non-corporate purposes.3 The court in the principal case recognized 1:he
validity of this informal corporate approval, relying principally upon two
theories. First, the court held that the corporate entity will be ignored
when the interests of justice require. On numerous occasions, other courts
have so held. 4 Although the result in a particular case may be desirable,
this approach is open to question, for once the corporate entity is overlooked, further problems may arise.11 The second and sounder theory advanced by the court6 is that ratification at an informal meeting where all

N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950) §§58-205, 58-206.
Tuttle v. Junior Building Corp., 228 N.C. 507, 46 S.E. (2d) 313 (J948); O'Neal v.
Wake County, 196 N.C. 184, 145 S.E. 28 (1928); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., §44
(1946).
3 Whitwell v. Henry, (Ark. 1956) 286 S.W. (2d) 852; Bergman Drive-In v. Houston
Sash and Door Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) 256 S.W. (2d) 661. See .DORIS AND FREEDMAN,
CORPORATE MEETINGS, MINUTES, AND REsOLUTIONS, 3d ed., 133 (1951).
4 Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 241 N.C. 473, 85 S.E. (2d) 677 (1955),
noted in 34 N.C. L. REv. 531 (1956), quoted extensively in the principal case, held the
court will automatically ignore the separate corporate existence if it is owned by one man.
Accord: Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder, (8th Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 263; Komow v.
Simplex Cloth-Cutting Machine Co., 109 Misc. 358, 179 N.Y.S. 682 (1919), affd. 191 App.
Div. 884, 180 N.Y.S. 942 (1920), takes the unique position that since all the parties to the
agreement owned all the stock of the corporation, they were in the relation of partners.
IS For example, the courts must decide whether the income of the corporation is to
be taxed as the income of the individual stockholder and whether the debts of the corporation are to be considered the debts of the individual stockholders. The Supreme
Court of the United States recognized these difficulties when it limited its application of
this theory to those exceptional situations where recognizing the corporate entity would
prevent adequate protection of public or private rights. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 435 at 442 (1934). See generally, "Disregarding corporate existence," 34 A.L.R.
597 (1925).
6 This view assumes that the rights of creditors are not prejudiced. Since the theory
arose to achieve justice in a particular case, it would not be applicable if its application
would be detrimental to third parties.
1

2

454

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 55

the stockholders are present constitutes adequate corporate approval.1 In
addition to being consistent with accepted legal principles in recognizing
the separate corporate existence, this solution eliminates the problems
implicit in the first theory. Since the general rule requiring approval at a
formal meeting is for the benefit of the stockholders, i.e., to assure them of
thoughtful action, they should be able to waive the formal requirements. 8
If all the stockholders concur in the waiver, there can be no justification for
a plea of ultra vires on the part of the stockholders or the corporation.9
The instant decision, estopping the stockholders who received their interests from the president from asserting a position inconsistent with prior
unanimous stockholder approval follows logically from the legal principle
that an informal board of directors meeting is binding on the corporation.10
This case is indicative of a desirable trend in the law toward resolution of
the conflict between the formal requirements necessary for corporate action
and the informal manner in which stockholders frequently conduct the
business. It is hoped the courts will not complicate the movement by becoming needlessly involved with the problems inherent in ignoring the
corporate entity when the simpler theory offers an equally desirable solution.
Guy Maxfield

7 Bulger v. Colonial House of Flushing, 281 App. Div. 847, 119 N.Y.S. (2d) 233 (1953).
Lake Park Development Co. v. Paul Steenberg Construction Co., 201 Minn. 396, 276 N.W.
651 (1937), on facts are quite similar to the principal case held the stockholders may even
invest the officers with power to perform ultra vires acts or to appropriate corporate
.assets to non-corporate purposes.
SMacQueen v. Dollar Savings Bank Co., 133 Ohio St. 579, 15 N.E. (2d) 529 (1938);
,People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E. 834 (1890).
9 Temple Enterprises v. Combs, 164 Ore. 133, 100 P. (2d) 613 (1940).
l0Thompson v. M. K. & T. Oil Co., 5 Cal. App. (2d) 117, 42 P. (2d) 374 (1935);
Merchants and Farmers Bank v. Harris Lumber Co., 103 Ark. 283, 146 S.W. 508 (1912).

